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The question whether professional instruction in the law is
properly a university function has been, in one aspect or another, a perennial issue for several generations. For the most
part, until comparatively recent years at least, the disputed
point has been whether the university law school, as compared
with other institutions for instruction, could perform adequately
the task of preparing aspirants for the practice of law. That
phase of the question may now be considered settled for all practical purposes.' Almost no one will at the present time deny
that the qualified university law school does a competent job,
2
within well-recognized and self-imposed limitations, of supplying the profession and the public with men who are reasonably
well prepared to be entrusted with the protection of their
clients' interests.
But the question is a two-edged one. Now that the universities are secure in the claim that they excel in the preparation
of students for the bar, perhaps the time has come when emphasis should be placed upon the question's other aspect. Is
the adequate training of students for the proficient practice of
law a task with which the university should appropriately concern itself? When the university law school undertook this task
it assumed a dual trusteeship: to the profession and the public
it assumed the responsibility of affording a type of instruction
which would insure, so far as possible, against the dangers of
tLL.B., Mercer University, 1935; A.B., 1937. Assistant Professor of
Law; Wake Forest College.
1. See Hanna, The Law School as a Function of the University (1932)
10 N. C. L. Rev. 117, 149.
2. Cf. Hanna, supra, note 1, at 149-150: "No one expects the law school
completely to train the lawyer. It gives him a technique, and a certain
familiarity with his future materials. The rest of the training he must
give himself over many years. Part of the function of the law school is
to give the apprentice a chance to mature a little in a contemplative and
non-sordid atmosphere. The law school recognizes an enormous variety
in types of law practice and a tendency to specialize. Its attitude is that
no one can tell what its students will actually do in practice. * * * The law
school consequently aims to cover subject matter in which will be found as
many common elements as possible of all kinds of law practice."
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the incompetent and irresponsible lawyer; to the university it
impliedly gave assurance that the purposes, the traditions, the
mission of the university would be safe in its hands. It was to
be a professional training school; but it was to remain part,
nevertheless, of an institution whose functions had been defined
in rather idealistic terms of personal integrity and social responsibility, an institution of higher education in the best understood sense of the expression. Though ably and efficiently discharging the former of its two obligations, the law school may
yet lapse into complacency with respect to its fulfillment of the
latter, despite constant vigilance and self-criticism and continual striving for improvement.
Certainly it is not the purpose of this paper to contend that
there is no rightful place in the scheme of the university for
professional instruction in law. Rather the purpose is to inquire,
with that capacity for self-criticism which characterizes the
educated mind which is the object of the university training,
what it is that justifies the existence of the university law school,
and to what extent the law school in purpose and in practice
fails to conform to the objectives which are its justification.
Let it be noted that this project is not stated in its more obvious
affirmative form: the present discussion does not undertake
to marshal the evidence as to the many respects in which the
law schools have taken thought and made provision for their
broader responsibilities. The map could be impressively dotted
with schools which leave little to be desired in the application
of ingenuity and energy to conform to the highest standards
which have been suggested. But these achievements speak for
themselves, or have had their capable spokesmen. Nor is the
present writer so callow as to suppose that he is by any means
alone in feeling concern that the law schools should address
themselves earnestly to the performance of their more comprehensive function. There are many teachers of law who have
given the problem sincere and constant consideration, and who
have vigorously written, planned, and acted to the end that the
law school should prove deserving of its position as part of an
educational institution; so many, in fact, that the mention of a
few' is necessarily unfair to the others whose work cannot be
3. In addition to those whose contributions are noticed more particularly
herein, the following have in various published works considered the
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acknowledged. Self-congratulation, however, is all too familiarly the tone of discussions of legal institutions by the gentlemen of the legal profession;' and here in the pages of the law
review (the very existence of which, by the way, is evidence
that the law schools are sensible of their higher calling) we can
afford to indulge in a rigorous self-criticism, even though we
do not in all cases expressly admit our virtues, without caring
for the aid and comfort which such an examination may give
the opposition.5
There are some, no doubt, to whom the suggestion that the
university law school's justification is anything but obvious will
savor of profanation. Yet our claim to a place in the educational sun cannot be taken for granted. Others question it.
It is an open secret that our colleagues in other sectors of the
campus sometimes regard us with the jealousy and suspicion
reserved for interlopers. Bertrand Russellg appears to think
that the prevalence of professional instruction in the universities is merely a phenomenon of our plutocratic society, the
result of insistence by dominating holders of the purse-strings,
"practical" men who care nothing for "culture." Certainly it
cannot be said that the law school is inherently entitled to its
present accepted position within the university's gates. The
first American professorship in law was established at the college of .William and Mary in 1779, having as its only precedent
the Vinerian chair at Oxford, established in 1758; but it was
not until the founding of the Harvard Law School, in 1817, that
the university law school, devoted to the professional training
of lawyers, appeared in anything like its present form; and
question: Wesley N. Hohfeld, Roscoe Pound, John H. Wigmore, Karl N.
Llewellyn, H. Claude Horack, Herschel W. Arant, William 0. Douglas,
Lloyd K. Garrison, Leon Green, Malcolm Sharp, James M. Landis, John
Dickinson, and others.
4. For example, in an address before the North Carolina State Bar at
Raleigh, October 28, 1939, Mr. Frank J. Hogan, President of the American
Bar Association, said: "I am not surprised when cynical philosophers and
misled politicians take a fling at us, but I am both surprised and angered
when lawyers themselves do it! In spite of all the wisecracks, the alleged
wit, and the splenetic denunciations aimed at him, the lawyer has survived
and continues to be the minister of public justice, the defender of private
rights, the adviser in the most sacred things of life, the 'unbonded fiduciary of a thousand trusts.' * * * Since General Grant stepped out of the
White House only two of our thirteen Presidents have come from all other
professions;, vocations, and occupations combined."
5. Cf. Hanna, supra, note 1, at 123, 124.
6. Education and the Good Life (1926) 304.

Published by Digital Commons Production Test Site, 2013

3

1939]

8219_importb.xml,
24 [2013], Iss. 4, Art. 3
THE LAWVol.
SCHOOL

the innovation was not generally adopted until after 1840. 7 We
must make out our title on some more positive muniments than
prescription or inheritance.
Perhaps the most facile apology for university law training
would be that hoary formula of smugness, that the law is a
"learned" profession. No law school would now accept the
support of such a broken reed for its pretensions. In the first
place it may be doubted whether the profession deserves the
compliment implied in this rather meaningless expression ;8 and
in the second place it will be stoutly denied in responsible quarters that the modern university exists for any such narrowly
utilitarian purpose as the mere imparting and perpetuation of
lore, professional or otherwise. Dean Pound recently said9 to
an audience composed largely of law students, "In a very real
sense your education will consist of what you have left after
you have forgotten all that you may learn." If this be true
of legal education, then the fact that we perform the service
of lodging a certain amount of esoteric information in the mind
of the prospective lawyer is insufficient justification for our
existence, and we must ask ourselves what we do in addition
to warrant our pose as educators.
The temptation may be strong to comfort ourselves with the
reflection that the university law school performs a great social
service. We need, and will have always with us, the lawyers;
incompetent lawyers are a social menace and an economic drain;
the preeminence of the university in the training of capable
lawyers having been demonstrated, it is not only a worthy function but almost a duty of the university to continue this service
to the community. The premises of such an argument are very
sound; the conclusion seems to follow; and yet it falls short
of stating a purpose, the pursuit of which would call forth the
best that the university law school has to offer. It is the refuge
of those who would adopt the easy complacency of the view
that in the diligent performance of the former of our two obligations, that to the public, we ipso facto will be discharging the
latter. It is, moreover, a pessimistic and defeatist point of view,
7. Brown, Lawyers and the Promotion of Justice (1938) 24-28.
8. See the pertinent remarks of H. S. Richards in Handbook of Association of American Law Schools (1926) 31, quoted in Hanna, supra, note 1,
at 127.

9. In an address at Duke University, February 17, 1939.
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in that it seems to assume that lawyers are a necessary evil,
and that the mere alleviation of the evil is a high purpose. It
is a striking confirmation of the observationlo that the law
school has an unduly modest, if not a shrinking, conception of
its relation to the university and its objectives. It is not enough.
It proceeds upon another premise, not often stated, which is
unsound. If the Massachusetts Institute of Technology could
produce better neckties than the manufacturers, that fact would
not necessarily argue for necktie production by that institution
as a public service, and therefore as an appropriatefunction
of an educationalinstitution. That lawyers and neckties are two
different commodities is not only a distinction to be noted, but
is in fact the very point of the discussion: universities are justified in producing lawyers, and not neckties, for society, if at
all, precisely for the reason that lawyers are human beings and
the producer can instill into them something more than the inanimate excellence of a skillfully finished product. What, then,
is this additional ingredient, the supplying of which is the university's justification as a lawyer-factory, and to what extent
is it supplied by the university?
John Stuart Mill, justifying the absence of professional instruction from the ideal university, somewhat paradoxically
achieved a fair statement of the purposes of the university law
school as they are now frequently defined:
What professional men should carry away with them
from a University, is not professional knowledge, but that
which should direct the use of their professional knowledge,
and bring the light of general culture to illuminate the
technicalities of a special pursuit. Men may be competent
lawyers without general education, but it depends on general education to make them philosophic lawyers-who demand, and are capable of apprehending, principles, instead
of merely cramming their memory with details. * * * Education makes a man a more intelligent shoemaker, if that
be his occupation, but not by teaching him to make shoes;
it does so by the mental exercise it gives, and the habits it
impresses.
This, then, is what a mathematician would call the higher
limit of University education: its province ends where education, ceasing to be general, branches off into departments
adapted to the individual's destination in life."
10. Hanna, supra, note 1, at 149.
11. Rectorial Address University of St. Andrews (1867) 21, quoted in
Thwing, Education According to Some Modem Masters (1916) 149, 160.
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We would, of course, modify this statement to some extent
today. We believe that professional knowledge itself is one of the
things a university should give to a prospective lawyer, and
we would certainly deny the likelihood of a man's becoming
a very capable lawyer without general education. Making
these allowances for the time and environment of this dictum,
it becomes remarkably similar to some of our own statements
of policy. If this is all, however, there can be little question but that our law schools justify themselves. We are
entitled to insist that above all else we devote our energies
to the training of men who "are capable of apprehending
principles instead of merely cramming their memory with details." Our use of the case system 12 almost alone establishes that
fact. We can, indeed, justly claim that we do much more than
this. If education is spoken of in terms of freedom from the
stultification of authoritarian scholasticism, of the critical attitude, of the development of the inquiring mind, we may feel
relieved to reflect that the renaissance has come to the law
schools, even to the smaller and more provincial ones, in a big
way. We have emerged from the darkness, to bask in the cool
light of our pragmatism, realism, and functionalism. Our students are brought to approach the law with a healthy skepticism,
if not so much for its institutions, at least as to its "principles."
But is this quite sufficient? We emphasize the social and economic significance and content of the law in a newhigh degree,
particularly in those schools which have adopted revised curricula including material which was formerly considered "nonlegal." This innovation may be regarded as the highest development thus far of a technique for presenting law to the student
in perspective as part of the complex scheme of human affairs.
It is perhaps the flower of all our efforts until now to discover
the formula which will bring about the simultaneous fulfilIment
of both phases of the university law school's obligation. As such
it deserves more than passing notice, for it is just at this point
that we need to be most vigilant, most critical of solutions, most
wary of false assumptions. When there is greatest apparent
cause for satisfaction with an hypothesis, there is the utmost
need for careful checking to assure ourselves that it can be relied
on. It may be well to consider what the introduction of this
method is intended to accomplish.
12. This feature of our curricula is discussed further below.
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Latest of the schools to announce the adoption of a curriculumrevised along the lines indicated is the Washington University
School of Law. The listing in the projected program of such
courses as Legal History, the Profession of the Bar, Legal Processes, Legal Accounting, Law and Economic Problems, Law and
Adjustment of the Individual, Family Law, Regulation of Economic Competition, and Jurisprudence, significantly indicates
the trend of thought and the extent of the departure from traditional methods. It is interesting to note the following explanation accompanying the announcement:
In requiring six years of university training for all graduates and introducing new material into the law curriculum
the Faculty is adhering to the objective which American law
schools have thus far emphasized, namely, the professional
trainingof lawyers.1 3 The material newly introduced relates
largely to the social and economic problems with which law
must deal. The purposes of the revised course of study are:
(1) to improve the ability of graduates of the School to
solve the problems arising in the course of their individual
professional activity, whether as practitioners, administrators, or judges; (2) to aid in producing a bar which is
better equipped than at present to deal collectively with the
issues that confront it in legal administration; and (3) to
train individuals who, when called upon to participate in
business administration or public service, can do so with
understanding.'
Thus those who have formulated this plan do not expressly
claim for it what others undoubtedly, and with considerable
justification, will: that it offers, in addition to improved technique in the production of good lawyers, the best curricular
vehicle thus far devised for the fulfillment of the obligation of
the law school as an integral part of the university.' It is reassuring that they do not. For what we have to fear most, if
we are concerned for the excellence of our performance in the
role of educators, is the making of any assumption to the effect
that merely by producing more efficient lawyers we are thereby
13. Italics supplied.
14. Announcement of Revised Curriculum, Washington University School
of Law. (March 1, 1939.)
15. Perhaps the reticence on this point is partly to be accounted for by
the fact that the explanation was presumably intended in large part for
the benefit of some who have not yet become convinced of what now seems
the obvious truth, that the ends of a purely practical professional education
may be well served by the adoption of such a curriculum.

Published by Digital Commons Production Test Site, 2013

7

1939]

8219_importb.xml,
24 [2013], Iss. 4, Art. 3
SCHOOL
THE LAWVol.

fulfilling our equally important function. What we have to fear
is becoming involved in the deadly satisfaction which characterizes the bar generally, 6 that a good lawyer is the noblest product of evolution, that his work is necessarily a social blessing,
and that his is unmistakably the good life.
The training of men proficient in the arts of advocacy is not
obviously an end of itself worthy of the efforts of a university.
Probably no other profession is so pregnant with potential ambiguity in this regard. Although the doctors also have their
important questions of social 17 and personal' 8 integrity, their
problem does not seem quite so fundamental as ours from this
point of view. A man proficient in the useful skills of saving
life and health cannot be very bad at his worst, so long as he
stays within the law and maintains respectability by adhering
to the meanest standard of ethics; but even an "ethical" lawyer
may be a social menace and an intellectual charlatan. It may
possibly be true that the lawyer can best serve the community
and fulfill his own destiny by applying himself diligently and
honestly to the furtherance of the interests of those who choose
to become his clients, but the probabilities are against it, and
in any event it ill becomes a university to assume that this is
true. Unless the discussion is to become metaphysical in an
extreme degree we may admit that the university would be
reasonably safe in taking it for granted that preservation of
the interests of patients in their lives and health is an end
worthy in itself. The variform interests of the lawyer's clients
are another matter.
Of course, there is a stereotyped professional answer to attempts of this kind to impose upon the lawyers responsibility
for the results they bring about through the use of their professional skill. This has been put in favorable form, without
rancor, by an impartial writer:
16. The use of such a generalization is of course unfortunate and would
be inexcusable, without qualification, under other circumstances. It -is
employed here without debilitating moderation to emphasize, inter nos, an
attitude which is certainly all too prevalent.
17. Professor Henry Sigerist is conducting at Johns Hopkins University

a course in "Medicine and Its Relations to Society." See Time, January 30,
1939, p. 51.

18. Cf. A. J. Cronin, The Citadel (1937). It is unfortunate, and perhaps
significant of the failure of our law schools to build a tradition of high
professional rectitude, that no such novel has been written of the law.

Until such a one can be plausibly written, it might be well if we said less
about "the noble profession."
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In our competitive society an attorney is brought into a
case by only one party. It is his duty-limited by a sense
of professional restraint, to be sure, but without immediate
concern for the attainment of the most just result-to advance the claims and interests of his client. Thus our system
of administering justice demands partisan advocates on the
one hand. On the other, it demands impartial judges, and
juries, who, after having been enlightened by partisans for
each side of the controversy, will supposedly be better able
to reach a just decision. Under such a system lawyers can
be held individually responsible for shortcomings in the
promotion of justice only to the extent that they are lacking in integrity, ability, adequate training, or a willingness
to cooperate with their colleagues in remedying conditions. 19
That lawyers can take refuge in such a classic gem of casuistry,
and at the same time claim credit as responsible leaders of society, is indication of a truly remarkable faculty for ambidextrous self-justification. The student who is permitted to accept
this reasoning unquestioningly is being permitted to vindicate
for himself a long life of clever insincerity and dispensation
from the cares of the ordinary conscientious citizen, for which
he will fall into the habit of claiming high honors. He is further
being permitted to close his mind to critical examination of
the essential machinery of the administration of law, for the
successes of which he, though free of responsibility, will still be
sedulous to accept credit. It seems strange to us now that our
forebears allowed the event of a litigation to depend upon the
physical prowess of the parties; it may some day seem equally
strange that we permit it to turn upon the forensic skill of
their agents.
This product of wishful thinking is a view which the university law school can neither recommend to its students as sound
nor accept for its own justification. Its sophistry is implicitly
recognized in Thurman Arnold's excoriation of the "adversary
method" of arriving at the truth of facts and the right application of law in judicial questions. 20 For present purposes we may
19. Brown, Lauers and the Pronmotion of Justice (1938) 197.
20. Trial by Combat and the New Deal (1934) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 913,
922: "Mutual exaggeration is 'supposed to create lack of exaggeration.
Bitter partisanship in opposite directions is supposed to bring out the truth.
Of course no rational human being would apply such a theory to his own
affairs nor to other departments of the government. It has never been
supposed that bitter and partisan lobbying assisted legislative bodies in
their lawmaking. No investigation is conducted by hiring persons to argue
opposite sides. The common law is neither clear, sound, nor even capable
of being restated in areas where the results of cases are being most bit-
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relegate to the footnote Mr. Arnold's pertinent doubts as to the
viability of truth in such an atmosphere of partisan exaggeration
and spurious sincerity, and the institutional aspects of this
folkway. From the ethical point of view the theory is that the
individual lawyer's obligation as an intelligent member of society and his intellectual integrity as a human being are fulfilled and preserved by his impartial desire to see truth emerge,
necessarily, of course, as a compromise, between his own extravagances and those of his opponent, tempered, it may be,
by the level-headedness of a judge who, the lawyer hopes, will
not be swept off his feet even by the lawyer's own extended arts
of persuasion. The theory is not even within shouting distance
of the facts. No lawyer entertains any such desire except in a
desperate case. The lawyer is a pleader of causes. He is the
first to assert his lack of impartiality when taxed with his duty
to make account of his stewardship of our legal institutions and
processes. Witness his distaste for jurisprudence; it is not for
him, he will say, but for the jurist and the philosopher, to chart
the course of the law. Yet we now realize more clearly than ever
before that even as he pleads he is himself a modeller of the
law in proportion to his abilities.
If our defense must come to this; if all the power of our great
universities is brought to bear for the purpose of training adept
craftsmen with a code of values which might do credit to a
commercial radio announcer crying his sponsor's Wares, then
we have indeed been "piling Pelion upon Ossa to reach a pot of
jam on a pantry shelf."2'1 We have been producing not educated
leaders of society but mere "client caretakers. 22 We have laid
ourselves open to the just and searching charge that we produce "artisans of the law, but not architects of our institu2

tions."1
terly contested ***
Mutual exaggeration of opposing claims negative[s]
the whole theory of rational, scientific investigation. Yet in spite of this

most obvious fact, the ordinary teacher of law will insist (1) that combat
makes for clarity, (2) that heated arguments bring out the truth, and (3)

that anyone who doesn't believe this is a loose thinker. The explanation of
this attitude lies in the realm of social anthropology."
21. John Kieran in The New York Times, February 16, 1939, p. 26: 3.
22. Kales, A Comparative Study of the English and the Cook County

Judicial Establishments (1909) 4 Ill. L. Rev. 303, 318. In adopting Professor Kales' clever phraseology I mean to indicate no sympathy with his

view that what we need is a class of barristers after the English pattern.
23. Albert J. Harno, Letter to the Law Alumni of the University of
Illinois, April, 1937.
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It should clearly be the purpose of a university law school
to produce competent lawyers who are educated men and women
as well-not merely "philosophic" lawyers in the restricted
sense intended by Mfill, but lawyers whose education is thoroughly assimilated with the professional life and function upon
which *they are embarked. 2' Interpretations of the meaning of
education are legion, but an apt one is at hand:
To my mind, an educated person is not merely one who
can do something, whether it is giving a lecture on the
poetry of Horace, running a train, trying a lawsuit, or repairing the plumbing. He is also one who knows the significance of what he does, and he is one who cannot and
will not do certain things. He has acquired a set of values.
He has a "yes" and a "no," and they are his own. He knows
why he behaves as he does. He has learned what to prefer,
for he has lived in the presence of things that are preferable. * * * [He] has learned enough about human life on
this planet to see his behavior in the light of a body of experience and the relation of his actions to situations as a
whole. Such a person is acquiring a liberal education and
it makes little difference whether he has been trained in
philosophy or mechanics. He is being
transformed from an
5
automaton into a thinking being.2
It may be said that we must have artisans as well as architects.
I think the answer must be that, even so, the mechanism of the
university law school need not and must not be geared down
to their plioduction. An educated person must think; thinking,
he must have convictions; having convictions, and also having
highly developed mental ability and a position of influence, he
cannot live a life of intellectual prostitution by laying aside his
convictions for the purposes of his professional function, even
though he may take them up again on Sunday or in the bar
association meeting. If a man believes that the services of his
profession should be made more easily available to those in the
lower economic brackets, he does little to advance the cause by
declining the retainers of the indigent except where a contin24. It is also an important function of the university law school, of
course, to foster legal scholarship, to "push forward the frontiers of knowledge" in its field. Simpson, The Function of the University Law School,
(1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1068, 1074. The present writer, however, feels
neither impelled nor qualified to question the zeal of our law faculties in
this regard.
25. Everett Dean Martin, The Meaning of a Liberal Education (1926)
28.
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gent fee is practicable. If he believes deeply in civil liberties
it hardly becomes him to exert all his talents and his skill in an
effort to uphold an abridgment of them, even in court. If he
believes in the validity and desirability of a piece of legislation,
no amount of sophistry will justify his strenuous efforts to
secure its overthrow in litigation, no matter how ineffectual
those efforts may prove to be. If he is insincere in his efforts
he is disloyal to his client and to the court; if he is sincere he
is false to himself. An educated man cannot go through life
with his tongue in his cheek.
Dean Charles E. Clark recently had occasion to defend the
Yale Law School against charges of "radicalism" in its faculty
-charges apparently based upon nothing more than the fact
that members of the faculty were intelligent enough to have
formed opinions on matters of social interest, and sufficiently
alive to their duties as educators to discuss them on occasion
with their students. Explaining that otherwise the school might
have been "narrowly vocational and provincial," Dean Clark
said:
As individuals, teachers and students must have views or
remain colorless nonentities * * *. The great teachers of
law in the modern generation have been those who, by their
example and the stimulus of their minds, have led their
students to develop individual views which each could support as his own. One must have an hypothesis on which
to build his law. If the student had only teachers so neutral
as to attempt to reject all hypotheses he had better stay
away from law school and buy a legal digest or encyclopedia
instead. The student can expect men of different minds
and thoughts; he can expect, too, tolerance of dissident
views on the part of each individual instructor. * * * But he
is indeed lost if he gets men without ideas or opinions. 2
It is strange indeed that the law schools should be taken to task
by their critics for exercising the function which is their
raison d'etre; that they should be expected to apologize for that
which is their real justification; that their very standard should
have thus become a shield. The critics should learn their sub27
ject better. This is not to say, and Dean Clark did not mean,
26. Reports of the Dean and of the Librarianof the School of Law for
the Academic Year 1987-1938, Bulletin of Yale University (Supp. to Issue
of Oct. 15, 1938) 18, 19.
27. Id. at 16: " * * * the teaching courses are not made vehicles of
propaganda, and the legal issues covered by the various courses in the
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that the purpose of the law schools is to indoctrinate. Our function is not to inculcate creeds, but to remind our prospective
lawyers of their obligations to themselves and to society as
intelligent beings of respectable mental behavior; not to tell
them what to think, but continually to disabuse them of the
notion that they may now cease thinking except within the
limits of the interests of a client who has fortuitously employed
them; not to tell them that the influential position of lawyers
as leaders of society has been lost to them forever, but to warn
them of the dangers to that position of influence if it is abdicated by them in their professional conduct, to be reserved for
their occasional and avocational capacity as government officials.
The pretty little conceit which the lawyers invented to support their disclaimer of responsibility for their professional
progeny missed the boat largely because it fails to take into
account the lawyer's freedom of choice in the acceptance of employment. This, now, might be called an electric subject of
discussion if it had circulated in professional circles sufficiently
to have acquired any sort of reputation at all. Unpalatable
though the thought may be, however, the law school must sooner
or later face the problem squarely. An examination of some of
the texts and casebooks in the field of legal ethics, to which
such matters are commonly relinquished, will reveal a certain
delicacy and restraint in the treatment of the factors (other
than the more obvious ones relating to conflict of interest and
the like) which make for acceptance or rejection of proffered
employment. There seems to be a tendency to emphasize the
duty and the privilege to accept employment, and the privilege
to decline, rather than any duty to decline. Certain fairly familiar rationalizations are referred to as authoritative solutions of
the more perplexing hypothetical problems which the students
may concoct. One of the brilliant exceptions is Professor Elliott
E. Cheatham's recently published work. 28 His preface gives
blunt warning of what is to come:
The first purpose of this book * * * is to give an understanding of the legal profession as an institution, and to
encourage an appraisal of its work and organization in the
curriculum are fairly presented, with emphasis being put upon the student's own analysis and with a compulsion to every student to reach his
own conclusions."
28. Cases and Materials on the Legal Profession (1938).
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light of its social functions and of the conditions under
which it operates. In the last decade the law schools have
set about examining afresh almost every element of law
except the profession which administers it, yet many of
these other elements of law can better spare university
study than can the legal profession itself. The zeal of the
lawyer in advancing his clients' interests is constantly
modifying the substantive law through court decisions or
legislative action, and much study is given by the bar and
by laymen as a means to this modification. There are no
similar inducements, however, to a study by the profession
of its own activities. Such a study can well be made in law
schools, by those whose training and sympathies enable
them to understand the profession and whose work does
not necessarily2 incline them to uphold its inherited position
and practices. '

The American Bar Association's Canons of Professional
Ethics do, it is true, treat this matter straightforwardly, although briefly and without exactly laying the Association open
to the charge that it is preaching. 30 Canon 31 is especially
worthy of note in this connection:
No lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate
for every person who may wish to become his client. He has
the right to decline employment. Every lawyer upon his
own responsibility must decide what employment he will
accept as counsel, what causes he will bring into Court for
plaintiffs, what cases he will contest in Court for defendants. The responsibility for advising as to questionable
transactions, for bringing questionable suits, for urging
questionable defenses, is the lawyer's responsibility. He
cannot escape it by urging as an excuse that he is only
following his client's instructions.
What the Canon does not point out is the gravity of the university law school's obligation when it comes to shaping this vital
sense of responsibility in the lawyer-to-be. In the very nature
of things there can be no sanctions imposed by the bar for
neglect of responsibility in the higher planes of professional
behavior, where the choice of a course rests within the individ29. Cheatham, op. cit. supra, note 28, at v, vi.
30. Canons 4, 5, 6,30, 31. Appended to the Canons is also a recommended

form of Oath of Admission which includes the following clause: "I will not

counsel or maintain any suit or proceeding which shall appear to me to be
unjust, nor any defense except such as I believe to be honestly debatable

under the law of the land."
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ual's discretion. The discretion itself must be developed. We
need to ask ourselves constantly whether we are producing
lawyers who will fit too aptly into the picture connoted by that
vivid appellation of cinematic gangster-slang, "mouthpiece."
The average student comes to law school originally with his
head full of questioning about problems of professional ethics
and about the justice of the law. We need to be extremely careful not to damage this healthy attitude by evasion or by answering authoritatively that most of the conduct he questions is
"permissible" under enforceable codes of ethics. We need to be
equally careful not to stifle his curiosity about the manner in
which the law deals with human controversy. Perhaps our
sophistication has been carried too far when we can blandly
quiet doubts and questioning by repeating the obvious but inadequate observation that "law is not the same as justice." Why
is it that justice as a topic of discussion is in such disrepute in
the law schools? Granted that the concept is vague and variable,
our ignoring it does little to aid the student in fulfilling the
oath,8 1 which he will later take, not to "counsel or maintain any
suit or proceeding which shall appear to me to be unjust." If
the form of words is to have meaning the lawyer must have
formed some concept of justice, and no agency seems more
appropriate than the university law school for the development
of such, a concept.
There are of course limits to the implications of this thesis.
In many of the routine problems of the law no principle of
social or ethical significance is involved except that disputes
should be settled honestly and expeditiously within the framework of the existing order. A wise practical consideration confines the sweep of our skepticism: "Our effective thought in a
problem-solving situation is oriented by the problem itself and
by the purpose of solving it. ' 'a2 If the suit is to recover a profit
on a wholesaler's contract, we cannot go into remote discussions
of the economic soundness and social justice of the profit system-that is one of the conditions which gave rise to the problem; we cannot fulminate about the economic waste of middlemen; we cannot question the propriety of governmental sanction for private promises; we cannot go sighing off after anarch31. Quoted supra, note 30.
32. Morris, How Lawyers Think (1938) 6, 7.
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ist utopias and universal brotherhood. But these routine matters are not alone the meat on which we feed. There is not a
day during which lively and significant issues are not injected
into the business of the classroom. If it were not so the law
could not command the interest of men of the stature of our
teachers.
The most likely response, among these teachers, to the arguments here put forward is not indignation, but boredom. This
may be considered an attempted conquest of mind over what
does not matter, a tilt with a man of straw. The university law
schools are well aware of their responsibilities, and are constantly devising new methods of carrying them into execution.
There is no occasion to elaborate the obvious. One may hope
that this is true, and at the same time regret that there is so
ready an impulse to claim it. That this paper is not intended
as a jeremiad will bear repetition here. The achievements which
have been made are acknowledged with admiration; the sincere
thought devoted to the problem by teachers of law is beyond
praise. But the responsibility involved is too important for us
to run the risk of lapsing into what may prove to be a false sense
of security concerning its fulfillment. Indeed, what we have
most to bear is that our efforts in this direction will exhaust
themselves in methodology, in the devising of some technique
which can be relied on to insure us against failure, in the discovery of some curricular philosopher's stone which will have
the property of transmuting our day to day efforts into successful achievement.
When we are able to examine it more closely, the ingenious
revised curriculum may appear to be one of the devices from
which such results will be expected. Our realism has achieved
relevance for "extra-legal," "non-technical," "policy" factors in
the scheme of legal education.-s But to what end? Is not the
emphasis here, as always before, upon the development of the
expert technician who will be able to predict with a greater
degree of accuracy and to control, to some extent, the decision
of the court? The student wants to learn all of the tricks so
that he can undertake either side of a given question, depending
upon whether it happens to be the prospective plaintiff or the
defendant who favors him by making an appointment. Today
33. Fuller, American Legal Realism (1934) 82 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 429.

http://testing.bepress.com/lawreview1/vol24/iss4/3

16

492

Currie: TheUNIVERSITY
Law School as an
Educational
Institution[Vol. 24
QUARTERLY
LAW
WASHINGTON

the slickest trick is to know that the court may respond to
what were once considered non-legal considerations. The court's
response to considerations of justice was so unpredictable that
it was long ago discarded as useless for technical purposes.
We used to emphasize rules, giving carefully the "minority"
as well as the "majority" view, with particular attention to all
"exceptions" to both. We used to investigate the historical
soundness of the rule, partly perhaps in the interest of an
aesthetic appreciation of symmetry of growth, but primarily
to give the student as a lawyer a fulcrum upon which he might
rest to overturn his adversary's case. Similarly we tested the
"logic" of the rule, and more recently we developed the elaborate technique of evaluating and distinguishing cases. Now we
impress upon the student the unreality of law except as a
prophecy of the action of a court, and teach him to take into
account in making his prediction the social and economic factors which, we now realize, may affect that action in the same
way that precedent and logic may. But to impart this acute and
discriminating skill is only one of our functions. There should
be general agreement with Hanft 4 that the change of emphasis
from the point of view of the judge to that of the practitioner
is a decided improvement in modern legal education; but we
shall lose something of vital importance if we allow this deference tothe functional to deprive us of examination of the ends
of the law and the manner in which they are being served by
the profession. A great deal has been said as to what the character of the law student's education should be in view of the
fact that he is more likely than his fellow students in the university to become a judge, a legislator, or a public administrator
-and that is good. More should be, and is being, said as to
what it should be in view of the fact that very probably he will
become a lawyer-and that is even better. Yet much more needs
to be said as to what it should be in view of the fact that quite
certainly he will become a human being. "The dominant vocation of all human beings at all times is living-intellectual and
moral growth," said John Dewey.8 1
It will not do to say that this is the task of the university
proper, as distinguished from the law school. Another of our
34. Legal Education Yields to the Times (1937) 47 Yale L. J.214.
35. Democracy and Education (1916) 362.
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philosopher's stones is the requirement of a specified number
of years of pre-legal general education. But the law school itself has a very definite responsibility here which cannot be successfully shifted to others. Our task is the assimilation of law
into the general culture which has been acquired; the correlation
and application to the law of the attitudes of mind and the concepts of right thinking which the university inculcates in its
general way; the readjustment, in short, of the educated man
who is to become a lawyer. For this specific task the teachers
of sociology, philosophy, government, economics, history and
psychology are not equipped. They have not the time to advert
particularly to the significance for law and lawyers of what they
teach. They have not, as a rule, the specialized knowledge of
the problems of the law which is essential to the accomplishment
of such a result. And even if they had the time and the technical understanding, there would still be the disadvantage that
they are laymen, and therefore deprived of any great influence
for this purpose, for the pre-legal student is often, in his attitude toward the unanointed, already a confirmed legalist. There
is the further objection that ordinarily, when the student comes
to us, the university has finished with him. If it has done a
good job he will come with an eagerness to orient himself in
his new character. But unless we are alive to our own responsibility we run considerable risk of relieving him of this troublesome complaint, if not directly by indulging professional assumptions, then indirectly by keeping him so occupied in the study
of the veins of the leaves that he has no chance of seeing the
forest. After a few years of this, the student will be equipped
to meet any educationalizing influence he may encounter later
in life with contempt for the layman's lack of comprehension.
It will not do. The law school cannot delegate to others the task
which it alone can adequately perform, that of reconciling law
and culture, and of helping the student to make the reorientation called for by his election of a professional career.
In this connection, one of the features of the new curriculum
at the Washington University School of Law is the requirement,
during the final two years of the four-year course, of nine hours
of work in other divisions of the University. This collateral
study "has the three-fold purpose of permitting the student to
satisfy educational needs of which he may have become con-
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scious, of throwing him into intellectual contact with students
having different backgrounds and objectives, and of reminding
him that he is a person as well as a prospective lawyer." 85 This
is perhaps the most direct effort to devise a means of solving
the problem. It is one which promises much, but is as yet untried and there is still the difficulty that it is not so much a
solution as it is a transfer of responsibility.
Nor can we acquit ourselves of the task by an airy relegation
of questions of social obligations to the field of legal ethics, although such an expedient may tempt those of us who delight to
label and to classify. In the first place, courses in this subject
are not given in all schools; a survey 37 made a few years ago,
covering 66 members of the Association of American Law
Schools, indicated that of this number only 47 offered a course
in Legal Ethics, and that in only 31 of these was the course
required for graduation. The "usual" time devoted to the subject was one to two hours. It is common knowledge that, at
least in some of the schools offering such a course, it is the
football of the curriculum; and perhaps in view of its usually
perfunctory content it deserves no better fate. What is more
to the point, the problem of the university law school, now under
discussion, is too important for the responsibility of working
it out to be imposed upon any one member of the faculty, even if
his best-directed efforts, taken by themselves, would be calculated to be effective. Professor Cheatham himself points out
that exhortation is unlikely to make much impression on the
student.3 8
Only a brief while ago our panacea was the case method, and
our faith in its efficacy is only just beginning to waver. Here
was a gadget that would almost run itself. Dean Clark, in an
omitted portion of the passage quoted above,19 spoke of it in
glowing terms:
It is one of the glories of the case method of law instruction that one is forced to see the flexibility and mobility of
law and the possibility of directing and moulding its growth.
36. Announcement of Revised Curriculum, Washington University School
of Law. (March 1, 1939.)
37. Report of Committee on Curriculum, Handbook of Association of
American Law Schools (1933) 148-153.
38. Cheatham, op. cit. supra, note 28, at vi. And see Simpson, The Function of the University Law School (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1068, 1083.
39. Supra, p. 487.
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Text writers and law lecturers might conceal what they
were doing under the guise of merely stating the existing
law. This is not possible under the case method, where the
individual is forced to make his own deductions, to see
that law is a prophecy, and to determine the direction of
his own thinking.'These sentiments meet with sharp contradiction, however, in
the views of Professor Edson R. Sunderland"1 and Dean Albert
J. Harno,' 2 both of whom take the position that this device has
a positively deterimental effect. Surely the truth is that the
case system is merely a technique for the teaching of law, and
that for good or ill it is nothing more unless we make it
such. Dean Clark imposed upon himself and his faculty, in
his generous praise of this brainchild of Langdell and Ames,
an unwarranted self-effacement. The Yale Law School is not
dependent for its prestige upon any such stratagem, but it might
have become "narrowly vocational and provincial," indeed,
despite the use of this vehicle of presentation, without men in
whose hands the case system can achieve significance.
This must, in the last analysis, be the answer to our problem, notwithstanding all of the contrivances and tours de force
which have been and will later be conceived. There is no philosopher's stone; we shall find no method of fulfilling our obligation to train capable lawyers, which will produce, as an
effortless by-product, fulfillment of our obligation as an educational institution. One may imagine a school which has all
of the fashionable accoutrements: it may require a full academic
degree for admission; it may have vital courses in Jurisprudence
and Ethics; it may use the case system; it may have a stream40. Reports of the Dean, op. cit. supra, note 26, at 18.
41. Law Schools and the Legal Profession (1931) 7 Am. Law School

Rev. 97.

42. In a letter to the Law Alumni of the University of Illinois, April,
1937, Dean Harno wrote: "There is * * * a growing conviction * * * that
it tends to produce lawyers who are too narrowly trained for the heavy
responsibilities which today are laid upon them. * * * The case method
does not tend to inculcate broad conceptions or to engender in the mind of
the lawyer a sense of perspective so that he may view the place and function of the law in the social structure. When trained through the case
method, the lawyer is likely to work entirely within the law, and to live
his two score years of professional life drawing inferences and conclusions
here, making refinements there, but never working his way out to view
the contours of the law in relief. Here is the difference between the workman and the architect. The case method tends to train artisans of the law,
but not architects of our institutions."
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lined curriculum, with interpolated sojourns in the College of
Liberal Arts; and still such a school would not necessarily be
performing adequately the function which principally justifies
its connection with the university. On the other hand, a school
unable to make use of one or more of these admittedly helpful
prescriptions may nevertheless be performing its educational
function admirably. The problem must be solved the hard
way, by unceasing conscious and subconscious emphasis on the
part of the entire faculty, day in and day out; by inexorably
facing the facts, including the difficulty of living on high ideals.
The aim and office of instruction, say many people, is to
make a man a good citizen, or a good Christian, or a gentleman; or it is to fit him to get on in the world, or it is to
enable him to do his duty in that state of life to which he
is called. It is none of these, and the modern spirit more
and more discerns it to be none of these. These are at best
secondary and indirect aims of instruction; its prime direct
aim is to enable a man to know himself and the world.43
Add that we, as instructors, must aid a man to know himself
in his professional character and to understand the full intellectual and social meaning of law as a profession, and we have
stated here a purpose which will not permit relaxation of our
vigilance. The liberal, humane, and democratic spirit must
be helped to find expression in the pursuit of the law. That such
a happr adjustment is possible, the lives of Holmes and Cardozo, among others, bear eloquent witness; but we shall not
produce the like of these men unless we recall Holmes' belief
that education "lies mainly in the shaping of men's interests
and aims," and heed his admonition that it is the business of
44
a law school "to teach law in the grand manner."
43. Matthew Arnold, Higher Schools and Universities in Germany (1874)
154.
44. The Use of Law Schools, in Collected Legal Papers (1921) 35, quoted
in Cheatham, op. cit. supra, note 28, at vi.
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